Biopiracy -the appropriation of genetic resources from a country without its authorisation -and the fact that the expected flow of benefits from the commercial utilisation of genetic resources had not materialised, despite the mandatory requirement for benefit-sharing included in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 1 fuelled the clamour by developing countries for an international regime on access and benefit-sharing (ABS). The call, primarily by mega-diverse developing countries, to stem the leakages of benefits, morphed into a firm resolution by world leaders at the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, that a benefit-sharing regime be put in place under the auspices of the CBD.
2 After some tentative starts, and the adoption of the Bonn Guidelines on ABS in 2002, 3 a mandate was finally established in 2004 by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the CBD, to negotiate an international ABS regime. 4 The central thrust of developing countries' endeavours has always been to tackle biopiracy, which results in depriving provider countries of its resources without duly sharing the benefits. The logic is simple: benefit-sharing serves as the incentive and can be the source of the required technological knowhow to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity. In other words, the three objectives of the CBD 5 are integrally linked. Undermine one and all collapse. According to this logic, an international ABS regime had to put in place effective user measures; that is, countries with users in their jurisdiction, creating products out of genetic resources, had to ensure that these resources were not misappropriated in violation of the provider country's legal and other requirements. Provider countries could manage compliance for resources accessed and used within such jurisdiction. However, only an international regime could reach users operating outside their jurisdiction.
For four years, from 2004 to 2008, negotiations conducted in a Working Group under the CBD, and several other formats, yielded little. Developing and developed countries engaged in a seemingly never-ending waltz: the former insisting on benefit-sharing provisions only; the latter focusing exclusively on measures facilitating access.
The final text of the Nagoya Protocol was delivered by the Japanese presidency of the CBD COP 10, in a sumitomo-lock 'take-it-or-leave-it' style, on the afternoon of the last day of the two-week COP held in Nagoya in October 2010. It is reported that the draft presented was the result of backroom deals, 6 reflecting the negotiating positions of developed countries whilst ignoring those of developing countries.
7 Others argue that, at least, a large part of the result of the negotiations was included.
8 Whatever the view, undeniably, this is not a Protocol concluded through the usual negotiating process. Nor was it concluded, as suggested, at 'ministerial informal consultations'. It is also inapposite to describe the final meeting by the Presidency as 'a meeting with Ministers behind closed doors' (Buck and Hamilton, "The Nagoya Protocol," 50) as a
